|
|
![]() |
![]() |
|
|
| |
||||||||||||||||||||
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNET WORLD
Personal (or in personam) jurisdiction can be defined as the courts power to compel a defendant to appear before it, to adjudicate claims made by or against the defendant, and to enforce any judgment entered in connection with such claims. In the absence of personal jurisdiction, a court may not exercise judicial power over a defendant. A court must dismiss a lawsuit upon discovery that personal jurisdiction does not exist. Any judgment entered by a court that is eventually found to lack personal jurisdiction is ineffectual and need not be honored by a court in a different jurisdiction. A defense of lack of personal jurisdiction must be promptly raised since, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction can be waived. A defendant who fails to timely raise the defense is deemed to have acquiesced to the courts jurisdiction and may not subsequently seek dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Initially, the limits of a courts personal jurisdiction were strictly defined by territorial boundaries. That is, whether or not a court could exercise dominion over a person was determined exclusively by the geographic territory where the person could be physically found. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). With technological advances in transportation and communications, the activities of individuals have become increasingly more likely to impact on jurisdictions well outside their immediate geographic region. To keep pace with technology, jurisprudence surrounding personal jurisdiction has gradually had to evolve in order to preserve an equitable and relevant judicial system. The Internet is the latest of such technological advancements which periodically require courts to rethink and adjust the framework used to delineate personal jurisdiction. It should come as no surprise that one of the primary reasons for the great success of the Internet the blurring, if not erasing, of geographic boundaries also presents the greatest challenge to the formulation of a rational and fair framework for determining the jurisdictional reach of state and federal courts. What is more, the breakneck speed of Internet adoption by individuals and businesses has left courts to their own devices to quickly develop a modified framework to accommodate a new breed of disputes making its way to the courthouse. As with any hastily developed area of law, different courts have used different approaches to the problem resulting in competing theories. Although patterns have begun to emerge and some approaches have gained wider acceptance than others, this area of law remains very much in flux.
A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.
Floridas long-arm statute, although broad, is not nearly as expansive as Californias and, therefore, the first step of the analysis is necessary. Floridas long-arm statute, codified under Section 48.193, reads, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
Subsections (1)(a), (b), (f), and (g) are of particular relevance to the instant discussion insofar as they cover most situations likely to arise in the context of Internet-related litigation. It should be noted that courts have demonstrated a tendency to interpret Floridas long-arm statute quite broadly and therefore it is normally not a difficult task to establish that there is a statutory grant of personal jurisdiction. See e.g. Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999)(broadly interpreting Floridas long-arm statute to mean that a defendant who commits a tort that causes injury in Florida is subject to personal jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b) regardless of where the act that caused the injury was completed.)
Long-Arm Statute Considerations. As indicated above, Florida's long-arm statute is not a simple extension of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and therefore the activities of the defendant must first be analyzed to determine whether they fit within those categorized by the statute as triggering jurisdiction over non-residents. In the Internet context, this analysis is fairly straightforward and does not vary greatly from that necessary in other areas of the law. Limiting this analysis to situations most likely to arise in Internet-related litigation, Florida's long-arm statute generally provides that state courts have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident person or business who: (a) operates a business in the state; (b) has an office in the state; (c) commits a tort that causes injury in the state; (d) solicits within the state; (e) manufactures, processes or services products, materials, or things used or consumed within the state; or (f) breaches a contract by failing to perform an act required by the contract to be performed in the state. At this time there do not appear to be any reported Florida state court cases which discuss in detail the application of the long-arm statute to activities conducted exclusively online. However, using history as a guide, it is reasonable to assume that Internet-related activities will be treated as other types of commercial activity. The grounds for jurisdiction enumerated by the long-arm statute easily lend themselves to case-specific factual analysis. Furthermore, the historical tendency to interpret the long-arm statute broadly with regard to commercial activities should be expected to extend to Internet-related activities.
The answer to this question has resulted in the formulation of two significantly different approaches. The first approach, typified by the opinion in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), allows for extremely broad personal jurisdiction based solely on the availability of the defendant's website to citizens in the forum state. The second approach, which tracks its genesis to Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997), provides a much more reasoned approach which analyzes they type of contact generated by the defendant's Internet presence in relation with the forum state. Not surprisingly, the Zippo approach has gained wide acceptance while the Inset approach has been severely criticized and marginalized.
The essence of the Inset decision is the court's conclusion that the mere act of publishing a website, regardless of the level of interaction between the publisher and the end user, subjects an entity to personal jurisdiction everywhere the website may be accessed. The decision is remarkable in that the court focused its attention on the quantity and pervasiveness of the contacts between the defendant and the forum, but completely ignored the fact that the defendant made no attempt to target citizens of the forum. The fact that the defendant's website was completely informational and offered no interactivity with the end user, tantamount to an Internet billboard, did not deter the court from issuing the highly criticized opinion. As stated above, and for obvious reasons, the approach formulated by the Inset court has been severely criticized and has received minimal support. It should be noted, however, that the Inset decision is not completely devoid of followers as it has been cited approvingly in at least one other federal case and it has not been expressly overturned. In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp 1328 (E.D.Mo. 1996), the court relied on Inset in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss despite the fact that the defendant's entire contacts with the forum state (Missouri) consisted of the maintenance of a website with a server in California which was accessible "accessible to every internet-connected computer in Missouri and the world." Id at 1330. As was the case in Inset, the Maritz court concentrated on the fact that the defendant's website was accessible to large numbers of users in the forum state and by providing such access the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Missouri and therefore should reasonably expect to be haled into court there.
In Zippo, a Pennsylvania plaintiff sued a California defendant for trademark infringement and dilution. The lawsuit was filed in federal court in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of, among other things, a famous line of tobacco lighters. The defendant was the operator of a website and internet news service linked to various domain names featuring the word "ZIPPO". The defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania occurred almost exclusively over the Internet and consisted of contracting with approximately 3,000 Pennsylvania residents to allow them access to its online news service. The Pennsylvania subscribers accounted for approximately 2% of the defendants 140,000 subscriber base at the time of the lawsuit. At the outset of the case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the Pennsylvania long-arm statute allowed for the exercise of personal jurisdiction "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States", the only issue left for the Court to decide was whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant was constitutionally permitted. After analyzing the available case law, the court concluded that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Zippo Manufacturing Co., 952 F.Supp at 1124. Thus, in deciding that personal jurisdiction was proper, the court established a "sliding scale" approach to classifying Internet web sites. Within this sliding scale, the Zippo court defined three distinct levels of websites based on their commercial nature and level of interactivity:
Since the Zippo opinion was first issued in 1997, the sliding scale test has been adopted by courts in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th 10th, 11th and D.C. Circuits. See Cuccioli v. Jekyll & Hyde Neue Metropol Bremen Theater Produktion Gmbh & Co., 150 F.Supp.2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); BancMortgage Fin Corp. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9025 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2000); Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 F.Supp.2d 913 (S.D. W. Va. 2001); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. Tex. 1999); Noegen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 109 F.Supp.2d 746 (E.D. Mich. 2000); MJC-A World of Quality, Inc. v. Wishpets Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13178 (N.D. Ill. August 22, 2001); Uncle Sams Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sams Army Navy Outfitters-Manhattan, Inc. 96 F.Supp.2d 919 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. Ariz. 1997); Soma Med. Intl v. Standard Chtd. Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. Utah 1999); Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F.Supp.2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 1998).
The JB Oxford court concluded that the combination of the interactive websites and the tenuous commercial activity directed by the defendant to Florida residents did not constitute sufficient "minimum contacts" and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Citing Zippo, the court stated that due process "requires contacts that illustrate purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting commercial activity in the forum contacts that tie the defendant to a particular state, not those that merely link with equal strength the defendant to other states." JB Oxford, 76 F.Supp. at 1367. The sliding scale test was also relied upon in the more recent case of Nida Corporation v. Ken Nida, 118 F.Supp. 2d 1223 (M.D.Fla. 2000). In the Nida case, a corporation residing in Florida sued a citizen of the state of California for trademark infringement. The parties stipulated that the contacts between the defendant and Florida consisted of sales of its products to Florida residents between 1995 and 2000 resulting in approximately $27,500 as well as a website maintained by the defendant which was accessible to Internet-connected Florida residents. The parties also stipulated that the defendant's website was neither passive nor commercial and instead fell within the interactive middle-ground established by Zippo. As in JB Oxford, the court concluded that jurisdiction in Florida over a citizen of California was proper under Florida's long-arm statute. However, unlike the JB Oxford case, the court in Nida held that the combination of an interactive website and sales of products to Florida residents over a five-year period constituted "contacts with the State of Florida comfortably in excess of the bare Constitutional minimum necessary to satisfy the Due Process Clause." Nida, 118 F.Supp. 2d at 1231. Thus, the JB Oxford and Nida cases illustrate how Florida has initially defined the middle part of the Zippo sliding scale spectrum. Similarly, two other Florida cases have helped better define the two opposite extremes of the spectrum. The first such case, Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (M.D.Fla. 1999) alludes to the fact that in Florida, active commercial solicitation by a non-resident through an Internet website (i.e., operating a commercial website), can by itself, be sufficient to establish the required minimum contacts. Unfortunately, the court could not base its opinion on this because there was no evidence on the record that the subject website even existed at the time the alleged cause of action accrued. Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. Finally, and most recently, in Miami Breakers Soccer Club, Inc. v. Women's United Soccer Association, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D.Fla. 2001), the court held that a website which advertised products for sale but which required customers to call a toll free number to make a purchase must be classified as passive and may not form the basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Echoing the words of the Zippo decision, the court declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant and stated that "because Florida residents cannot contract with the defendants through their web sites to make purchases, the Court finds that defendants' web sites are passive." Id. at 1329.
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
| PaperStreet Web Design | ||